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The Spanish Scholastics of the sixteenth century are generally known as the precursors
of Hugo Grotius in the application of natural law and the law of nations (ius
gentium) to the political relations of early modern states. Their writings on the
American Indians have been read as especially significant for the formation of the
humanist–colonialist legacy of (European) international law. I have no quarrel
with these views. This essay will, however, claim that the principal legacy of the
Salamanca scholars lay in their development of a vocabulary of private rights (of
dominium) that enabled the universal ordering of international relations by recourse
to private property, contract, and exchange. This vocabulary provided an efficient
articulation for Europe’s ‘informal empire’ over the rest of the world and is still oper-
ative as the legal foundation of global relations of power.
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I Introduction: The empire of private law
‘Empire’ and ‘imperialism’ are powerful words – though they may have
lost some of their force from constant iteration in practically every discus-
sion of global problems, especially among discussants displaying political
realist sensitivities; which is probably why these words have traditionally
not had too much of a presence in international law. If they do occur,
it is usually in order to mark some contrast to law, perhaps an alternative
to law (and, of course, worse than it) as a way of organizing international
relations. The state of affairs has changed in recent years, however, largely
as a result of postcolonial influences as well as of the omnipresent desire
to discuss the US position in the world with a vocabulary that transcends
the boundary between analysis and criticism. But it is clear that
‘empire’ has entered international law, not only to provide an external
contrast to law in the dangerous world of politics, but as part of inter-
national law itself.
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This was always suggested in the work of realism-inspired legal histor-
ians such as Wilhelm Grewe, whose Epochs of International Law joins Carl
Schmitt’s work on the Nomos of the Earth in unabashedly assuming that
law and legal change are an effect of hegemonic struggles so that the
law of the ‘Spanish age’ may be contrasted with that of the ‘French
age,’ for example.1 For Grewe, as for Schmitt, empire lies in the realm
of politics and the state. These provide the ground from which, to use
Schmitt’s metaphor, cultural influences and law then ‘radiate’ to the
imperial periphery. More recent critics, who have pointed to the ‘colonial
origins of international law,’ have also identified these influences in the
way international law has been used by powerful Western states to exercise
their political domination in the world. Spanish, French, and Anglo-
American imperialism have thus made their way into the analyses of
past and present international law from both the political right and the
political left.
But clearly, this is not the only way to think about the operation of
imperialism within the law. While it is understandable that public inter-
national lawyers and historians have traditionally focused on the public
activities of sovereigns and on the formal imperial relationships that
may be embodied in international law rules and institutions, these are
only a small part of imperial relations, one arguably less important
than the relations that operate through the universal functioning of
such private-law rules as those concerning property and contract.
Lawyers are, of course, familiar with the distinction between public and
private international law, but the latter has normally been understood
to cover only a very limited set of rules and procedures having to with
the relations of national legal systems to each other. And while fields
such as lex mercatoria or transnational law have aimed to include a wider
set of materials having to do with the global operation of the economic
system, they have usually done this at the cost of losing the political
edge that attaches to studies of empire and imperialism.
In this essay, I will join colleagues who have worked to analyse relations
of private ordering within such aspects of public international law as the
laws of war and intervention, post-conflict governance, arbitration, trade
and investment, and so on. I shall aim to do this by focusing on the great
interest that men who are regularly thought of as the originators of inter-
national law also had in capturing the global operation of private
relations of domination in their analyses and theories. My claim is that,
by concentrating merely on what they say on such public law issues as
1 Wilhelm Grewe, Epochs of International Law, translated and revised by Michael Byers
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000); Carl Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth in the International
Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum, translated by GL Ulmen (New York: Telos Press,
2003).
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territory, jurisdiction, and formal war and by ignoring those aspects of
their work that deal with the universal operation of property and contract,
we receive a truncated and one-sided image not only of what they were
doing but of the nature of the legal system that was emerging at the
time when they were writing and that has persisted much more powerfully
as part of global history than did any formal empire. The essay will thus
also make the point that the cantonization of different aspects of the
global operation of legal rules in different sub-disciplines has a dramati-
cally negative effect on our ability to understand how law actually chan-
nels global relationships of domination.
II The question of the Spanish origins
Culturally speaking, modern international law arose in the last third of
the nineteenth century. It emerged as part of the liberal internationalism
of the 1860s and 1870s and the turn by leading European powers –
Britain, France and somewhat belatedly Germany – to formal empire,
the annexation of colonies under the aegis of a civilizing mission.
When a group of men for the first time recognized each other as col-
leagues in a profession called ‘international law’ with the establishment
of the Institut de droit international in 1873, one of their first projects was
to determine the rules that would enable the ‘Scramble for Africa’ to
be taken to a peaceful conclusion. They supported King Le´opold’s ven-
tures in the Congo – some of the key members of the Institut were
close advisers to the king of the Belgians – and many of them acted as
advisors to their national delegations at the 1885 Congress of Berlin
where, under Chancellor Bismarck’s watchful eye, they distributed
among themselves pieces of what King Le´opold once called ‘ce magnifique
gateau’ of Africa.
The early international lawyers were liberals who supported the turn to
formal empire in order to protect the natives from the greed of colonial
companies and ensure the orderly progress of the civilizing mission. They
were imperialists not irrespective of their liberalism but as a consequence of
it: they were imperialists for the same reason that they endorsed free trade
and advocated penal reforms, new labour and social legislation, and
sometimes women’s rights and the spread of representative government
in Europe. They were usually Protestants – Belgians, Dutchmen,
Englishmen, and Germans, later joined by Americans and
Scandinavians. There were moderate Catholics, too, some Frenchmen,
a few Italians. As part of their gentle civilizing ethos, they were anti-
papists. The main operator behind the Institut, for example – Gustave
Rolin-Jaequemyns from Ghent – was a minister of education in
Belgium’s liberal government who removed religious teaching from the
schools. And the most famous member of the new profession, Johann
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Caspar Bluntschli from Germany, was a staunch ally of Bismarck’s
Kulturkampf.2
So it was no surprise that they contrasted their civilizing mission with
what they had learned of the conduct of the Spanish after the arrival
of Columbus at Hispan˜ola in 1492. All of them referred to the Leyenda
negra (black legend) – the account of Spanish imperialism first offered
by William of Orange in an ad hominem attack on Philip II in support of
the rebellion in the Low Countries in the late sixteenth century. Today,
we are familiar with its themes: Torquemada and the Inquisition;
Corte´s’s destruction of the Aztec empire, Pizarro’s slaying of the Inca
king Atahualpa at the battle of Cajamarca, and the plundering of Inca
gold; the depopulation of the Caribbean and genocide in New Spain
(Mexico) and New Castile (Colombia). Modern international law was
born as liberal empires turned to formal annexation. But its ideological
base lay in its righteous critique of the Spanish empire.3
But the founders of the profession found among the Spanish voices
some they could associate themselves with. In the 1880s, the Belgian
legal historian Ernst Nys first pointed to a tradition of late scholastic
teaching in Spain, especially at the University of Salamanca, which had
been critical of the conduct of the Conquista and actively propagated
domestic and universal laws to control and direct its course.4
Dominican theologians such as Francisco de Vitoria (1483/92–1546)
aligned themselves with the more famous Bartolome´ de Las Casas
(1484–1566) in defence of the Indians, insisting on their humanity as
well as their rights of property and jurisdiction. In the 1920s and 1930s,
these men were celebrated as precursors of the new profession by the
American internationalist James Brown Scott (1866–1943), assistant to
the Secretary of State, Elihu Root, an enthusiast of arbitration and the
League of Nations. Scott admired the humanitarian impulse behind
the teachings of these Spaniards and especially their propensity to
discuss empire in light of the law of nature and of nations, ius gentium.
Scott gave particular attention to the two public lectures (relectiones theolo-
gicae) given by Vitoria in 1538 and 1539 in Salamanca, which defended
Indian rights while simultaneously laying out rules for Spanish trade
and proselytizing in the newly conquered territories. Here, Scott suggests,
was an exemplary case of a conscientious publicist turning against the
2 This period is discussed in my The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of
International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
3 For an overview, see Joseph Pe´rez, La leyenda negra (Madrid: Gadir, 2009).
4 Ernest Nys, Les droits des Indiens et les publicistes espagnols (Brussels: P Weissenbruch,
1890); Ernest Nys, ‘Les publicistes espagnols du XVIe sie`cle et les droits des Indiens’
(1889) 21 Revue de droit international et de le´gislation compare´e 532.
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excesses of his own country in the interests of the greater good of
humanity.5
Since that time, international lawyers have seen their own humanitar-
ian sentiments, their legalism, and their sense of civilizing conduct
reflected in the part of the Spanish renaissance that resuscitated and
modified the ideas of Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) to formulate an intel-
lectual response to the challenges of an expanded but religiously split
world. No wonder that, during the Franco era, Spanish jurists grasped
at the paradox that liberal imperialists were deriving their ideology
from orthodox Catholic thought. From the 1950s to the 1970s, in the
United States and elsewhere, a new image of Spanish imperialism was
slowly emerging, in which the focus shifted from the actions of the con-
quistadores to the efforts of the crown of Castile to regulate the process
of colonization, including by prohibiting the use of slave labour and offi-
cially allowing the Indians to live in their communities under their native
caciques. Lewis Hanke’s 1949 classic, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the
Conquest of America, is typical of this literature.6 As its title suggests, it high-
lights the good intentions of the Spanish crown and the influence of
Dominicans such as Las Casas and Vitoria in the formation of official
policy, laying the main blame on the ruthlessness of single conquistadores
such as Corte´s and Pizarro, encomenderos and colonial administrators
adopting the attitude ‘Obedezco pero non cumplo (I obey but do not
comply)’ to laws sent in from Castile.7
The influence of these scholars on Spanish colonial laws was undeni-
able and persistent. Already in 1535, before Vitoria had given his famous
public lectures and even before Pizarro’s ships loaded with Inca gold had
arrived in Seville, his younger colleague Domingo de Soto (1494–1560),
holder of the Visperas chair at Salamanca, had publicly admitted that he
had no idea on what basis the Spaniards could exercise jurisdiction
over the Indians.8 Soto later became the chairman–rapporteur at the
5 See James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origins of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and
His Law of Nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934). For a discussion, see Christopher R
Rossi, Broken Chain of Being: James Brown Scott and the Origins of Modern International Law
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998).
6 Lewis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America, with a new
introduction (University Park, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 2002). See
further the recent work of the school’s main historiographer, Luciano Peren˜a, La
idea de justicia en la conquista de Ame´rica (Madrid: Mapfre, 1992) [Peren˜a, La idea de
justicia].
7 Henry Kamen, Spain 1469–1714: A Society of Conflict, 2nd ed (London: Longman, 1996)
at 160.
8 Domingo de Soto, Releccio´n ‘De dominio.’ Edicio´n critica y traduccio´n, con
introduccio´n, ape´ndices e indices, ed by Jaime Brufau Prats (Granada: Universidad
de Granada, 1964) § 34 (165): ‘. . . sed accipere ultra hoc bona illorum aut subiicere
imperio nostro, no video unde habeamus tale ius.’
THE SPANISH CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 5
famous 1550–1 junta in Valladolid that was called upon to decide the
dispute between Las Casas and the humanist scholar Juan Gines de
Sepu´lveda (1489–1573) on the question of Indian slavery. He also
acted as confessor to the emperor Charles V and represented Spain for
many years at the Council of Trent, where he arose as one of the foremost
ideologists of the Counter-Reformation. In all relevant respects, his views
on Indian–Spanish relationships are indistinguishable from those of
Vitoria.
In 1553/1556, Soto published his massive tract De iustitia et iure, where
he repeated the argument that he had already made in the 1535 lecture
that the humanity of the Indians was on a par with that of the Spanish
and that they enjoyed rights of jurisdiction and property like all other
human beings. Neither the Spaniards nor the pope could exercise juris-
diction over the Indians, whose rights of jurisdiction and ownership were
based in part on nature, in part on the consent of the relevant commu-
nities as they had once come together for the procurement of their
own good. Never had there been any such universal meeting in which
somebody was offered lordship over all the world. Moreover, the idea
that the emperor might have inherited the rights of the Romans over
all the world was simply ridiculous: not only had the Romans never pos-
sessed such jurisdiction in the New World – the argument that they still
had it owing to their special virtue completely overlooked the fact that
these possessions had been acquired by the force of arms, not through
their intellectual or moral qualities.9
III School of Salamanca and the Indian question
Vitoria and Soto were the originators of the ‘School of Salamanca’ – the
remarkable group of theologians and jurists concentrated around
9 Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure libri decem/De la justicia y el derecho en diez libros, intro
by PV Diego Carro, translated into Spanish by PM Gonzalez Ordonez (Madrid:
Instituto de Estudios Politico, 1967) 4.4.2 at 303–6 [Soto, De iustitia]. Soto was an
active participant in the Council of Trent, where he became known for his defence
of the traditional doctrine of justification against Italian delegates who sometimes
supported views closer to those of the Protestants; see Juan Belda Plans, La escuela
de Salamanca y la renovacio´n de la teologia en el siglo XVI (Madrid: Biblioteca de
autores cristianos, 2000) at 405–6 [Belda Plans, La escuela de Salamanca]. For Soto’s
biography, see generally ibid at 399–412. For Soto’s teaching and publishing
activity, see Jaime Brufau Prats, El pensamiento politico de Domingo de Soto y su
conceptio´n del poder (Salamanca, Spain: Ediciones Universidad Salamanca, 1960) at
12–7. For a discussion of the way Soto based dominium in part on nature, in part
on consent, see Annabel S Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature: Individual Rights in Later
Scholastic Thought (Cambridge, UK: University Press 1997) at 137–64 [Brett, Liberty,
Right and Nature].
6 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
Castile’s oldest university from which their teaching spread to the Iberian
peninsula and into the Americas in the course of the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries. Inspired by a humanist interest in matters of social
relevance, these men aimed to accommodate orthodox Thomism to
aspects of the via moderna its originators had learned in Paris so as to
deal with the tremendous political, economic, cultural, and religious
changes they witnessed taking place around them. The life of the
school is conventionally divided into three periods – that of the ‘foun-
ders,’ Vitoria and Soto; that of ‘expansion,’ whose representative
figures would be the two Dominican professors, Pedro de Sotomayor
(1500–64) and Bartolome´ de Medina (1527–81) (the former also
Professor at Valladolid), authors of large works on the Indies and on
the theory of law and justice; and finally, that of the ‘synthesis’ carried
out by men such as the Dominican Domingo de Ban˜ez (1528–1604)
and, of course, the Jesuit Francisco Sua´rez (1548–1617). The school’s
leading historiographer, Luciano Peren˜a, identifies altogether 125
larger synthetic works (usually in the Thomistic genres of De legibus, De
iustitia et iure, or their derivatives) in this period as representative of the
school’s intellectual ambiance.10 These also include works by experts in
canon and civil law, such as Martin de Azpilcueta (1491–1586) and
Diego de Covarrubias (1512–1577). Likewise, even if the influential writ-
ings of the civil lawyer Fernando Va´zquez de Menchaca (1512–59),
another contemporary of Vitoria at Salamanca, are quite different in
style from the latter’s scholasticism, the eclectic, fact-oriented humanism
10 For this way of presenting the school, see Luciano Peren˜a, ‘Estudio preliminaria: La
tesis de la paz dina´mica’ in Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de belli o paz dinamica, in
Luciano Peren˜a et al, eds, Escuela Espan˜ola de la paz: Primera generacio´n 1526–60
(Corpus Hispanorum de Pace, vol 6) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientificas, 1981) at 65 [Peren˜a, ‘Estudio preliminaria’]; and Peren˜a, La idea de
justicia, supra note 6 at 125–34. Belda Plans, La escuela de Salamanca, supra note 9 at
155–69, who begins with Vitoria (1526) and ends with the death of Ban˜ez (1604),
concentrates on the school’s theologians. His analysis relies on three criteria: (1)
linkage to both Salamanca and Vitoria, (2) a focus on the renovation of theology,
and (3) working in the tradition of the Summa of Aquinas. From this, two phases
may be distinguished: first, a period of innovation extending from Vitoria to
Bartolome´ de Medina (1527–80), the ‘father’ of probabilism; then, from the time of
Medina to that of Pedro de Herrera (1548–1630) and Ban˜ez, the last occupant of
the Prima chair, a more doctrinal phase, one characterized more by rivalry and
confrontation (especially with the Jesuits), with less attention to humanist styles or
themes. This approach excludes both jurists and Sua´rez (who never taught at
Salamanca). The first phase is dominated by the ‘three greats’ – Vitoria, Soto, and
Cano – and the second is less creative; ibid at 170, 178–82. For a new history that I
have so far been able to consult only superficially, see Miguel Anxo Pena Gonza´lez,
La escuela de Salamanca: De la Monarquı´a hispanica al Orbe cato´lico (Madrid: Biblioteca
de autores cristianos 2009).
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that he puts forward in his Controversiarum illustrium usuque frequentium libri
tres (1564) nevertheless ends up endorsing positions that do not really
differ from those of the rest.11
The views of these Spaniards on the rights of the Indians were quite
homogeneous. As against the older theory that Indians were natural
slaves put forward by one of Vitoria’s Paris teachers, the Scotsman John
Mair (1467–1550), they regarded the Indians as humans and thus, like
all humans, born free.12 They also invariably rejected the view that the
pope or the emperor might have rights of jurisdiction in the newly con-
quered territories. In the official view put forward in the notorious requer-
imiento that was supposed to be read to the Indians before war could be
waged against them, the pope had ‘donated’ these lands to the rulers
of Castile and Aragon. Soto, Vitoria, Las Casas, and all the rest completely
rejected this view: the kingdom of Christ was not of the world and could
not have been given to Peter or his followers to dispose of. Nor had the
emperor – Charles V – any better right. Roman law did not apply to
the Indians. Like Soto, Vitoria went meticulously through the unjust
claims that the Spanish had made: mere infidelity did not deprive of
the Indians of their rights – the contrary doctrine was, in fact, a
Protestant heresy. Nor were the Indians any more mad than people
who could be found in places in Spain. That they were sinners did not
deprive them of their rights – after all there were many sinners among
Christians, too, without this making them lose their property.13
These views are relatively well known and later theologians and jurists
of the School of Salamanca supplemented them in different ways, usually
11 For the biography of Va´zquez, see especially Kurt Seelmann, Die Lehre des Fernando
Vazquez de Menchaca vom Dominium (Cologne: Heymanns, 1979) at 25–30. The life
and (especially) fame of Va´zquez is also treated in Ernst Reibstein, Die Anfa¨nge des
neueren Natur- und Vo¨lkerrechts: Studien zu den ‘Controversiae illustres’ des Fernandus
Vasquius (1559) (Bern, Switzerland: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1949) at 19–27; and Camilo
Barcia Trelles, ‘Fernando Va´zquez de Menchaca (1512–1569). L’e´cole espagnole de
Droit International du XVIe sie`cle’ (1939) 67 Rec des Cours 430 at 433–42. The
best recent analysis is that offered by Annabel Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature, supra
note 9 at 165–204.
12 This view, incidentally, was also shared by the infamous drafter of the so-called
requerimiento, the legal counsel for the Spanish king, Juan Lo´pez de Palacios Rubios
(c 1450–1524), who not only accepted Indian ownership of property but even
thought that the Indians could wage just war against the Spanish if the latter tried
unjustly to deprive them of their goods; see Juan Lo´pez de Palacios Rubios, De las
Islas del Mar Oce´ano (Me´xico: Fondo de cultura econo´mica, 1954) at 61.
13 See Francisco Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’ in Francisco Vitoria, Political Writings,
ed by Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1991) 231 at 251–77 [Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’] [Vitoria, Political
Writings].
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in the Indians’ favour. The Augustinian Alonso de Veracruz (1507–84),
professor of theology at the University of Mexico, for example, noted in
1553 that the Indians had been in rightful possession of their property
and that the Spanish had arrived as aggressors.14 The Dominican
Domingo de Salazar (1512–94), the first Bishop of Manila, observed
the range of arguments in 1583 and noted the ‘condemnation by
nearly all writers in Spain and even in the Indies, of the conquests that
have been carried out against the Indians.’15 Moreover, despite the rever-
ence in which Vitoria was usually held, Las Casas and the famous Jesuit
Luis de Molina (1535–1600), the father of ‘Molinism,’ criticized
the broad basis on which he had advocated the ius communicandi to
justify the penetration of Indian lands. No European nation would
allow large numbers of armed foreigners freely to enter their countries.
Moreover, the Spanish themselves had expelled the Jews and the
Moriscos just a few years earlier. The ruler must, if peace and tranquillity
require this, prevent foreign traders and travellers from having access to
his realm.16
But even if most Spaniards agreed that the conquest had originally
taken place in an unlawful manner, this did not lead them to advocate
a speedy end to the presence of Spain in the New World. Soto, Vitoria,
Molina, and others agreed that the Spanish had to remain as trustees
in order to protect the innocent and to continue preaching the gospel.
If the Indians persisted in human sacrifice or the harassment of priests
or those who had been converted, force could continue to be used
against them.17 Leaving abruptly would undo the work of evangelization
and make the Indians lapse into their barbaric ways, they assumed. Not
everyone thought that this would necessitate permanent Spanish pres-
ence. At the beginning of the 1570s, the Bishop of Toledo, Bartolome´
14 Peren˜a, La idea de justicia, supra note 6 at 150–1.
15 Pedro Borges, ‘Proceso a las guerras de conquista’ in Juan de la Pen˜a, De bello contra
insulanos: Intervencio´n de Espan˜a en America, in Vidal Abril Castello´ & Luciano Peren˜a,
eds, Escuela Espan˜ola de la paz: Segunda generacio´n – Posicio´n de la Corona (Corpus
Hispanorum de Pace, vol 10) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de investigaciones
cientificas, 1982) at 24 [Pen˜a, De bello contra insulanos] [translated by author].
16 ‘Thus all people, towns, communities or autonomous kingdoms may, at the discretion
of their leader, act in a way that is in accordance with peace and tranquility . . . To this
end, he may deny entry into his territory, his province, or his town to anyone who would
like to do trade or sell goods by establishing himself there’; Las Casas, De thesauris in
Peru, cited in Francois Courtine, Nature et empire de la loi: E´tudes suare´ziennes (Paris:
Vrin, 1999) at 137–8 [translated by author]. See also Dieter Janssen, ‘Theorie der
gerechten Krieges’ in Frank Grunert & Kurt Seelmann, eds, Die Ordnung der Praxis:
Neue Studien zur spanischen Spa¨tscholastik (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001) at
230–1.
17 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians,’ supra note 13 at 291–2.
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de Carranza (1503–1576), estimated that it would take perhaps another
16 to 18 years for the work of civilization to be permanent so that the
Spaniards might be able to leave.18
Today, scholars such as Antony Anghie, China Mie´ville, and Robert
Williams argue with force that the Salamancans took back with the left
hand what they gave away with the right. The legal bases for the
European presence in the Indies granted them everything they
needed, furnishing a legal rationale for colonization and providing for
the needs of the empire. Even at their most appealing, the Spaniards’
arguments remained paternalistic and failed to respect Indian identity,
never for a moment treating them as equal to Europeans. In fact, the
argument goes, the Spaniards initiated the European practice of conduct-
ing colonialism and subjugating non-European cultures under a rhetoric
of civilization and trusteeship.19
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this postcolonial reading of the Secunda
Scholastica was met recently with a liberal retort from Georg Cavallar
and Pablo Zapatero, both of whom focus on the good intentions of the
Spaniards and their personal courage.20 After all, the emperor did react
in 1539 with a letter to the principal of the Convent of San Esteban,
where both Vitoria and Soto were residing, to prevent their teaching
and to destroy their manuscripts.21 Without their persistence, we might
not have known much about the plight of the Indians. However, by
that time, the famous campaign begun by Father Montesinos with a
sermon on Hispan˜ola that shocked churchgoers in 1511 had already
spread everywhere in the Spanish realm, and the emperor’s reaction
neither significantly tempered the Dominicans’ campaign nor occa-
sioned a serious breach between them. Just two years later, Vitoria was
again advising Charles on matters involving Indian conversions in
18 Luciano Peren˜a, ‘La intervencio´n de Espana en America’ in Pen˜a, De bello contra
insulanos, supra note 15 at 130–4.
19 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 13–31; China Mie´ville, Between Equal Rights: A
Marxist Theory of International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2005) at 173–8; Robert A Williams, Jr,
The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (New York:
Oxford, 1990) at 96–107.
20 See Georg Cavallar, ‘Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of
European Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?’ (2008) 10 Journal
of the History of International Law 181; Pablo Zapatero, ‘Legal Imagination in
Vitoria: The Power of Ideas’ (2009) 11 Journal of the History of International Law
221 especially at 267–71 (on Antony Anghie and Brett Bowden).
21 Jean-Francois Courtine, ‘Vitoria, Sua´rez et la naissance du droit de nature moderne’ in
Alain Renaut, ed, Naissances de modernite´: Histoire de la philosophie politique, t 2 (Paris:
Calmann-Le´vy, 1999) at 128; Luis Frayle Delgado, Pensamiento humanista de Francisco
Vitoria (Salamanca, Spain: San Esteban, 2004) at 42–3.
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Mexico.22 Neither Vitoria nor the much more polemical Las Casas had
any real doubt about the essential justice of the Spanish staying in the
Indies in order to carry out the work of evangelization. Vitoria also
rejected the French claim that the pope could not grant a monopoly
for the Spanish to engage in activities of conversion. Indeed, he
argued, even as the pope could not grant dominium, surely he could –
or even should – coordinate evangelization to the best of his ability.23
The arguments of Vitoria, Soto, and their successors provided a more
orderly basis for colonization, which is why they were taken seriously
in successive acts of imperial legislation – even as, in the face of the vig-
orous protests of the encomenderos, very few of the laws were actually
enforced.
These are the arguments as to the Spanish contribution to inter-
national law and empire that we usually cite. They continue the
polemic of the Leyenda negra. But, to me, they seem to neglect the com-
plexity of the moment and the continuing ambivalence of humanitarian-
ism. As Vitoria began teaching, there was no clear view of where the
Spanish (or Castilian) interests lay or what the position of the Church
ought to be. There was no uniform view among theological and secular
authorities as to right conduct in, or relations with the inhabitants of,
the New World.24 The Spaniards’ ‘universalism’ was so open-ended that
it could be and was used to support varying and often contradictory pol-
icies. Whatever the vocabulary used to describe it – evangelization, trus-
teeship, trade, civilization, development – the mere fact of their
supporting a presence in foreign lands is an insufficient basis for
judging where positions were developing, and it is unclear where the
interests of the different protagonists lay. Love is often difficult to dis-
tinguish from a desire to dominate – which is not to say that no distinc-
tion should be made between them.25
But I would like to suggest that the principal Spanish contribution is
not in those express arguments but in the development of a whole voca-
bulary that has since come to delineate the imperial dimensions of inter-
national law. At the heart of this vocabulary stand three notions already
familiar from Roman law and medieval Christianity – dominium, ius
gentium, and the bellum iustum. I would like to suggest that the most
22 Peren˜a, La idea de justicia, supra note 6 at 90–2; Luciano Peren˜a, La Escuela de
Salamanca: Proceso a la conquista de Ame´rica (Salamanca: Caja de Ahorros y Monte de
Piedad, 1986) at 29–30.
23 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians,’ supra note 13, 3.2 § 10 (284); Peren˜a, ‘Estudio
preliminaria,’ supra note 10 at 50–1.
24 Francisco Castilla Urbano, El pensamiento de Francisco de Vitoria: Filosofı´a, polı´tica e indio
ame´ricano (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1992) at 317–23.
25 For useful reflection on this theme, see Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The
Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).
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important Spanish contribution to the practice of empire lies in the
recovery of those three notions and in giving them a meaning through
which it was possible to react not only to the duda Indiana – the concerns
of conscience raised by the Spanish activities in the Indies – but to three
further transformations that took place in the period: the formation of
centralized political communities – states – that demanded absolute
loyalty from their citizens; the emergence of a global economic system
based on private ownership and the search for profit; and continuous
warfare, not only against the infidel, but among Christian rulers them-
selves. The notions of dominium, ius gentium, and the bellum iustum were
now deployed to give a legal and moral articulation to the transform-
ations of early modernity that disturbed the consciences of contempor-
aries – an articulation that, as I will argue, continues to give a distinctly
imperial structure to the most significant global laws and practices of
the present age.
IV Dominium and ius gentium
Let us start with two Latin notions with a long legal pedigree, dominium
and ius gentium. When Columbus left for the New World in 1492, no
serious debate had arisen on the legal basis of his action. Potential pro-
blems had been resolved in the Treaty of Aleac¸has and Toledo of
1479–80, where Portugal abandoned its claims to the Canaries in
exchange for the Spanish agreeing to respect Portuguese trade in
Africa.26 Spain’s title was derived from the Siete partidas27 that embodied
the Roman law notion of islands’ belonging to their first occupant in
accordance with the rules of the occupation of the sea in which the
island was found.28 The famous mediation of the pope was only required
as Portugal claimed the islands as part of the Azores. The line established
in the pope’s five letters, which include the Inter caetera of 5 May 1493, was
slightly amended and then reaffirmed by the Treaty of Tordesillas a year
later.29 The aim of Columbus’s voyage had been exclusively economic.
Evangelization had become part of the plan only through Queen
26 For the treaty, see John H Parry & Rachel Keith, eds, New Iberian World: A Documentary
History of the Discovery and Settlement of Latin America to the Early 17th Century, vol 1
(New York: Times Books, 1984) at 266–71.
27 Siete partidas, pt 3, title 28, law 29.
28 Miche`le Escamilla-Colin, ‘La question des justes titres – Repe`res juridiques: Des bulles
Alexandrines aux Lois de Burgos’ in Carmen Val Julian, ed, La conqueˆte de l’Ame´rique
espagnole et la question du droit (Fontenay-aux-Roses, France: E´ditions ENS, 1996) 81 at
86–7.
29 For these documents and those mentioned in the text following, see Parry & Keith,
supra note 26 at 271–80.
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Isabella’s famous ‘testament’ of 1504, which also spoke of the ‘civilization’
of the Indians.30
However, when the conquistadores returned from the Indies, many of
them had grave doubts of conscience weighing upon them. By what
right had they entered Indian communities, taken Indian goods, and
waged wars on Indian tribes? So they flocked the Convent of St
Esteban in Salamanca, where Vitoria and Soto lived, to confess their
sins and to seek absolution. But what kind of a sin was it to take infidel
property, to kill an Indian, and to occupy their land? Vitoria and Soto
were religious scholars who needed to teach their students about the
nature of the Spanish activities so as to prepare them to manage the sacra-
ment of penance properly – were the Spanish activities sinful? and if so,
how grave were their sins? Vitoria included a discussion of the Indian
question, for the first time, in his lectures on the Summa theologiae of
Aquinas of 1534–5 and in three famous public lectures (relectiones)
held in 1537–9. In all of these, Vitoria agreed with the point made in
Soto’s 1535 lecture on dominium that the Indians were rightful owners
of their property and that their chiefs validly exercised jurisdiction over
their tribes.31
To make this argument, Vitoria’s starting-point was that, under natural
law, as affirmed by tradition going back to the Church fathers and
Aquinas, no human being had natural dominion over another.
Everyone was born free and property was held in common.32 Judged
by natural law, however, not only the conquest, but every aspect of
sixteenth-century European life – continuous warfare between
European rulers, the emergence of an international system of trade
based on private property, and the search for profit – was a moral abom-
ination. One could not argue on the basis of natural law and hold the
conquest, or indeed the existing government in Europe, as anything
but a criminal conspiracy – as some, such as the notorious Juan de
Mariana (1536–1624), suggested. Humans could be ruled only through
force, Mariana would write, and nothing but the threat of tyrannicide
would keep rulers from oppressing their subjects.33
30 Escamilla-Colin, supra note 28 at 92–3.
31 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians,’ supra note 13, 2. 1–2 (252–64); and Francisco
Vitoria, ‘On the Law of War’ in Vitoria, Political Writings, supra note 13, 1.3 § 13 (293
at 303–4) [Vitoria, ‘Law of War’].
32 ‘Non cognoscit jus naturale differentiam inter homines, quia quidquid habet unus, est alterius de
jure naturali’ in Francisco de Vitoria, Comentarios a la Secunda secundae de Santo Toma´s, t 3,
ed Vicente Beltra´n de Heredia (Salamanca, 1932–5) 62.1 at n 18 (75) [Vitoria,
Comentarios].
33 Juan de Mariana, The King and the Education of the King (De Rege et Regis Institutione)
in George A Moore, ed (Washington, DC: Country Dollar Press, 1948) chs 5, 6 at
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But Vitoria would not go that way; he lumped Machiavellian amoralism
together with Protestant irrationalism. He was, thus, in a bind. On the
one hand, he could not endorse a divinely created natural law – an
ethic of love and common possession of everything – without undermin-
ing the policies of his emperor not only in the Indies but everywhere. On
the other hand, he could not endorse the raison d’e´tat either, without
appearing to be just like the cynical apologists of power Luther had
always accused Catholic churchmen of being. He needed a vocabulary
that would accept the basic contemporary forms of territorial govern-
ment, private ownership, and war but that would nevertheless restate
the unity of humankind under God. This was provided to him by the
twin vocabulary of dominium and ius gentium, the former covering a par-
ticular theory of forms of lawful human power, the latter extending
that theory to be applicable everywhere.
The first question Vitoria had to pose was how, if natural law provided
for freedom and communal ownership, was it at all possible for humans
to rule over each other and to own property:
‘But if it is the case that God made everything to be owned by all, and human
beings are the common owners of everything by natural law, how and from
which facts follows the division of things? [This division] is not made by
natural law. For natural law is always the same and never varies.34
The obvious answer, given by Vitoria also in his famous relectio on the
Indians, was that ‘dominion and supremacy ( praelatio) were introduced
by human law, not natural law.’35 But this raised a further problem.
How could merely human law deviate from a natural law whose origins
lay with God? Hence the issue of concern: were the conquistadors, the
traders, or indeed the emperor himself living in sin?
Vitoria resolved the problem in an impeccably scholastic way – by
making a distinction; namely, a distinction between binding and merely
recommendatory provisions of natural law. Freedom and common owner-
ship were not based on a binding prescription ( praescriptio) but only a rec-
ommendation (concessio). They provided for common property but did
not prohibit the divisio rerum – either in its public-law form of indepen-
dent communities or in terms of private property.36 The division was
undertaken by consensus – not by a formal consensus but by a ‘virtual’
135–51. For a discussion of Mariana’s pessimism, see Harold E Brown, Juan de Mariana
and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007).
34 ‘Sed si ita est quod deus fecit omnia communia omnibus, et homo est omnium dominus iure
naturali, quomodo et unde facta est ista rerum divisio? [This division] non est facta de iure
naturali: Patet quia ius naturale semper est idem et non variatur’ in Vitoria, Comentarios,
supra note 32, 62.1 at n 18 (74–5) [translated by author].
35 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians,’ supra note 13, 2.1 (254).
36 Vitoria, Comentarios, supra note 32, 62.1 at n 20 (77).
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one (‘non aliquo consensu formali, sed virtuali’); that is to say, by some taking
pieces of land into use and then others following suit. Because this div-
ision was valid everywhere, it could not have been based on the civil
law of this or that state. It had to have been undertaken by ius gentium.37
In his lecture on the Indians, Vitoria makes ius gentium do a lot of
work, from dividing territories and properties to supporting the right
to travel and to trade, to occupy terrae nullius, to enjoy the privileges of
citizenship, and to despatch ambassadors. Yet he is frustratingly unclear
about its legal nature. In an early lecture on civil power (1528), he
speaks of the ius gentium as a law enacted by ‘[t]he whole world which
is in a sense a commonwealth’ – a kind of universal positive law in
other words.38 Again, in the lecture on the Indians, he quotes the old defi-
nition by Gaius to the effect that the law of nations is ‘what natural reason
has established among all nations,’39 thus apparently collapsing ius
gentium into natural law. In his treatment of war, Vitoria regards military
action in self-defence as natural law, while admitting that even ‘custom
may establish the right and authority to wage war.’40
But Vitoria was not too concerned with legal classifications. In his lec-
tures on the Summa, he admitted that whether ius gentium was called
natural or positive was only a terminological issue.41 The important
point – a point often overlooked by commentators – was that he followed
Aquinas in locating the substance of ius gentium in the latter’s systematic
theology as part of ‘justice’ (iustitia) and not at all of the discussion of
‘law’ (ius). It was not a part of the external directives for human action
but of the internal directives – of the virtues – and more specifically,
of the other-related virtue of commutative justice.42 Now, commutative
justice focused on individuals’ (horizontal) relationships with each
other and not, like distributive justice, on the (vertical) relations
between the community and the individual. At the heart of commutative
justice, Vitoria found the Roman law concept of dominium, in both of its
senses as ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘ownership.’ If the prince had dominium over
37 Ibid, 62.1 at n 23 (79).
38 ‘On Civil Power,’ Vitoria, Political Writings, supra note 13, 3.5 § 21 (40) [Vitoria, ‘On
Civil Power’].
39 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians,’ supra note 13, 3.1 § (278).
40 Ibid at 302.
41 Vitoria, Comentarios, supra note 32, 57.3 at n 2 (14), 62.1 at n 23 (79).
42 Or in other words, his was a subjective-right based definition of ius as a ‘potestas vel
facultas conveniens alicui secundum leges’ (a power or faculty that belongs to somebody
in accordance with the law); ibid, 62.1 at n 5 (64) [translated by author]. For a
useful discussion of the theological context of Vitoria’s theory of dominium, see
Daniel Deckers, Gerechtigkeit und Recht: Eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung der
Gerechtigkeitslehre des Francisco de Vitoria (Freiburg, Germany: Universita¨tsverlag, 1991)
at 23–195.
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his commonwealth, this was because the community had delegated it to
him.43 And it was through dominium that Vitoria would analyse, not only
Spanish rights in the Indies, but also, and above all, the rights and
duties of Spanish and foreign travellers and traders engaging in manifold
commercial activities everywhere in the world. All humans had dominium
over their actions as part of their natural liberty. It was in this that they
resembled God. And the dominium they had as members of common-
wealths and over their lives and their goods was a part of that liberty.
On this theological basis, Vitoria and Soto derived a theory of individual
rights (of dominium) as well as of their universal applicability as the foun-
dation of just relationships between all human beings.44
In their lectures on the Indians, Vitoria and Soto concluded that all
humans enjoy dominium in both of its senses, as public-law jurisdiction
and as the private individual’s right of property over things lawfully
acquired. This right was based on natural law but the form of its specific
realization had been decided by human communities through ius
gentium. But even if its nature was historical and social, it was universally
valid and thus fully applicable to the infidel, too.45 And finally, as part of a
theory of virtue, it could be expressed as a subjective right or faculty that
could now be understood as part of a universal theory of commutative
justice: it would express social relations in inter-subjective terms as right-
ful forms of the exercise of dominium all over the world.
V A universal system of private exchanges
Through the discussion of dominium, Vitoria, Soto, and the subsequent
Salamanca scholars grounded an extensive right for human beings to
appropriate, use, transfer, or abandon things in accordance with their
choice. Such a right belonged only to rational (human) beings, but it
belonged to all of them. The Spanish Dominicans followed what had
been the official Church line since the Council of Constance (1414–8),
according to which neither sin nor infidelity took away dominium; that
was why Christians might lawfully engage in trade with pagans and the
43 This theory is laid out in quite a complicated and partly contradictory way in the early
lecture, Vitoria, ‘On Civil Power,’ supra note 38, § 5–8 (9–17).
44 See especially Vitoria’s commentary on the secunda secundae in Comentarios, supra note
32, 57.1 (1–6) (in which Vitoria adopts the Thomistic definition of ‘ius’ as the object of
‘iustitia’), 58.1 (20–1) (where the definition of ‘justice’ is given in terms of giving
everyone his due), and the discussion of dominium in terms of commutative justice
and as a property all humans have; ibid, 62.4 at ns 8–17 (67–74). See further Brett,
Liberty, Right and Nature, supra note 9 at 4–137. For Soto’s position regarding the
foundation of dominium in liberty and the use of the ‘light of reason,’ see Soto, De
iustitia, supra note 9, 4.1.1 (280a–b), 4.1.2 (283–5).
45 See ibid, 4.2.2 (290a–b).
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rights of ownership of the latter might be enforced even against the
Christians.46
But the problem was larger than questions about Indian rights. As
Vitoria was teaching, the gold and silver that were being imported to
Seville from the Indies and the export opportunities for manufactured
goods to the Americas as well as the financing related to those opportu-
nities began to create a network of global relations that would transform
the cultural and economic milieu all over Europe beyond recognition.
Commercial operators (including the Crown itself) were engaged in
new types of transaction – long-distance trade, monopolies, and price-
speculation – in a moral–legal gray zone that theologians could not
ignore. What to think of the drive to profits based on large-scale
exchanges of private property?47
For Aquinas, the move from common to private property originally
had a utilitarian basis: ‘[E]veryone is more diligent in procuring some-
thing for himself than something which is to belong to all or many’;
‘human affairs are conducted in a more orderly manner if each man is
responsible for the care of something which is his own’; and ‘a more
peaceful state of things is preserved for mankind if each is contented
with his own.’48 The Salamanca scholars followed this direction; their rela-
tively relaxed discussion of profit making in commercial operations and
usury presupposes the justice of such activities as long as they can be
understood as motivated by concern for the livelihood of one’s family
or the good of the commonwealth.49 True, many Christians were critical
of private property, pointing to biblical passages such Jesus’s statement
that the rich man will have difficulty entering Paradise (Luke 18.25).
But most of them followed Aquinas and accepted private property as a
pragmatic ‘addition’ to natural law (instead of a sinful deviation from
it) and valid overall as ius gentium, a position that was consolidated
within the Church at the latest during the Franciscan poverty
controversy.50
46 ‘Infideles possunt habere tale dominium supra christianos, id est stando in jure naturali, no perdit
infidelis dominium suum propter infidelitatem, sed talibus tenentur christiani obedire’ in Vitoria,
Comentarios, supra note 32, 62.10 § 1 (200).
47 For a rapid overview of the authors and the principal themes discussed here, see e.g.,
Dominec Mele´, ‘Early Business Ethics in Spain: The Salamanca School (1526–1614)’
(1999) 22:3 Journal of Business Ethics 175 at 177–84.
48 Aquinas, Political Writings, ed and translated by RW Dyson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) 66.2 at resp (208).
49 As especially stressed in Joseph A Schumpeter, Histoire de l’analyse e´conomique, t 1,
translated by J-C Casanova (Paris: Gallimard, 1983) at 141–57.
50 Aquinas, supra note 48, 66.2 (208); Janet Coleman, ‘Property and Poverty’ in JH Burns,
ed, The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c 350–c 1450 (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 621–5. On the Franciscan poverty controversy,
see ibid at 631–48; Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature, supra note 9 at 13–20.
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Soto, for example, begins his discussion of private ownership by attack-
ing what we might call Plato’s communist utopia in the Timaeus and the
Republic. The effective use of resources, he argues, requires that each be
given his own property to use and administer. Moreover, only such a div-
ision ensures the right distribution of burdens among the members of the
community. In Paradise, there may be sufficient fruit for everyone. But
since the expulsion, humans have had to work in order to earn their
living. In such conditions, maintaining common property would lead to
some working excessively while others would simply lie back to enjoy
the fruits of others’ labour. The peace, tranquillity, and friendship
sought after by the philosophers would inevitably be thwarted.51
Moreover, Soto points out following Aristotle, under conditions of
common property it would be impossible to cultivate the virtues of hospi-
tality and liberality – without private ownership neither of them would
serve any point.52
Everything Vitoria and Soto wrote about the laws of contract and
inheritance, prices, money, and commerce at home and with foreign
countries as well as about the objectives and limits of public power pre-
sumes not only the existence but the beneficial nature of private property
and the transactions connected with it.53 Such transactions had been dis-
cussed in Roman (civil) law, but no systemic view of them had emerged
until the scholastics brought them under the title of commutative
justice ‘intimately bound with the sacrament of confession.’54 For
Vitoria and Soto were keenly aware that the accumulation of wealth
51 Soto, De iustitia, supra note 9, 4.3.1 (296a–7a); ‘Hac ergo delira communitate praetermissa . . .
demonstrandum [est] quam sit congruens naturae corruptae possessionum divisio . . . nempe ex
humana negligentia et ex cupiditate’; ibid at 296b. See also Alejandro A Chafuen, Faith
and Liberty: The Economic Thought of the Late Scholastics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2003) at 33–4.
52 ‘Qui enim proprium non habet, liberalis esse non potest et qui omnia possidet, alienae liberitatis
non eget’; Soto, De iustitia, supra note 9, 4.3.1 (297b). See also Aristotle, The Politics,
translated by AT Sinclair, revised by TJ Saunders (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin
Books, 1981) at 1263a (115).
53 In this, they departed significantly from the views of medieval writers, who were usually
dubious about economic activity and accepted it only to the extent that it was directed
towards satisfying needs or caring for offspring; see, e.g., Antonio Garcı´a Garcı´a &
Bernardo Alonso Rodriquez, ‘El pensamiento econo´mico y el mundo del derecho
hasta el siglo XVI’ in Go´mez Camacho & Ricardo Robledo, eds, El pensamiento
econo´mico en la escuela de Salamanca (Salamanca, Spain: Ediciones Universidad de
Salamanca, 1998) 65 at 66–75 [Garcı´a Garcı´a & Rodriquez] [Camacho & Robledo].
Diana Wood observes that it was the Church that put a brake on economic activity;
for ‘to be socially ambitious, to want to be upwardly mobile, was a sin’; Diana Wood,
Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 3,
2–5.
54 Thomas Duve, ‘La teoria de la restitucio´n en Domingo de Soto: Su significacio´n para la
historia del derecho privado moderno’ in Juan Cruz Cruz, ed, La ley natural como
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could easily cross the threshold of the sin of avarice. In their commen-
taries on Aquinas, they thus balance their utilitarianism with their
concern for the souls of the merchants by developing an extremely
detailed casuistry of different types and practices of contracts, loans,
forms of exchange and insurance as well as other economic
transactions.55
Vitoria took up the law and ethics of commerce – that is to say, the
practice of buying cheap and selling dear – in his commentary to ques-
tions 77 and 78 of the Summa in his course in 1535–6.56 He did this by
following the Parisian nominalists and the greatest Dominican of the pre-
ceding period, Tommaso de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan (1468–1524).57
Following Aristotle, Vitoria distinguishes between two types of ars merca-
torum, ‘natural’ exchanges, the purpose of which was to see to the good
of the household (‘ad usus necessarios hominum’) and those ‘artificial’
operations whose point was to produce profit (‘ad lucrum’). The former
were just and lawful but the latter, especially if practised systematically,
involved great danger (‘est valde periculosum’) for the soul.58 Profit
making for private gain would constitute the mortal sin of avarice – it
was contrary to the virtues of liberality and justice. It distorted the
relationship of equality between the buyer and the seller that it was the
point of commutative justice to uphold and caused injury to others. Say
you buy a horse that you do not need only to sell it at a higher price.
In that case, you cause injury to the original seller, who could have
received a higher price by dealing directly with the person to whom
you sold it. And you injure that third person because, in interacting
directly with the original seller, he might have made a better bargain.59
fundamento moral y jurı´dico en Domingo de Soto (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de
Navarra, 2007) 181 at 190, 187–90.
55 Belda Plans, La escuela de Salamanca, supra note 9 at 926; Jose´ Barrientos Garcı´a, ‘El
pensamiento econo´mico en la perspectiva filosofico-teologica’ in Camacho &
Robledo, supra note 53, 93 at 94–5 [Barrientos Garcı´a, ‘El pensamiento
econo´mico’]. To give a sense of the detailed nature of the result, it might be noted
that Vitoria’s discussion of the question of ‘whether it is allowed to receive for loan
something else than money in exchange’ is divided into seventy-five paragraphs that
discuss fifty-one ‘doubtful cases,’ many of them developed in several ‘corollaries,’ all
of which are taken from the modern Latin edition and total altogether sixty-eight
pages in Vitoria, Comentarios, supra note 32, 68.2 (167–235).
56 Ibid (106–240).
57 For Vitoria’s sources, see Jose´ Barrientos Garcı´a, Un siglo de moral economica en
Salamanca (1526–1629): Francisco de Vitoria y Domingo de Soto (Salamanca, Spain:
Ediciones de Universidad de Salamanca 1985) at 31–6 [Barrientos Garcı´a, Un siglo
de moral economica].
58 Vitoria, Comentarios, supra note 32, 77.4 § 2 (146).
59 ‘Dicunt ergo omnes doctores supra allegati quod tales peccant mortaliter’; ibid, 77.4 § 4 (149).
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Like Aquinas, however, Vitoria assumed that the justice of profit
making depended ultimately on its purpose, and he did not wish to dis-
courage activities that were beneficial to the commonwealth. What was
needed was to learn to discriminate among situations. The profit due
to the merchant could be justified above all by the change that had
been made in the commodity by transporting it from the place where
it was bought to the place where it would be sold. As the goods were
sold in a location where they were scarce or perhaps not available at
all, the merchant was performing a socially useful service for which he
could be justly rewarded (‘hoc est necessarium ad bonum et ad provisionem
reipublicae’).60 If profit enabled commerce where it would otherwise be
lacking, or if it contributed to the good of the community in other
ways, it was just. The focus on the subjective motivations of the seller
was, of course, a highly fluid standard. For example, Vitoria argued
that, if a necessary item – such as wheat, for example – was scarce, but
the seller waited until its price rose, then his action would constitute,
depending on the gravity of the matter, either venial or mortal sin.61
On the other hand, however, Vitoria also took up the classical example
of the merchant who has arrived in a port and begins to sell the grain
he has on board. He knows that more ships are underway, which
means that the price of grain will soon sink. Does he have the duty to dis-
close what he knows? Vitoria’s accepting that keeping silent in this situ-
ation is not a sin shows that he was prepared to accept attitudes in
commerce which he would not have accepted between individuals other-
wise. Like all the scholastics, he was, of course, adamant that fraud or
coercion is always illegitimate, including keeping silent about a defect
in a product that one knows about. But he did accept that at least
some special rules applied in commercial relations.62
An especially significant extension of the theory of dominium was the
subjective (but non-arbitrary) theory of the ‘just price’ that lies at the heart
of the Salamancans’ views on commerce.63 Drawing on the nominalist
60 Ibid, 77.4 § 2 (147).
61 Ibid, 77.4 § 1–2 (141–7). This is, in fact, a very lax standard – for mortal sin is involved
only if profit is actually intended to harm others. If it is motivated only by greed, the sin
is venial – a sign that Vitoria and the humanists generally were shifting attention from
the state of mind of the economic operators to the actual injury possibly caused by their
operations; see Garcı´a Garcı´a & Rodriquez, supra note 53 at 82.
62 Barrientos Garcı´a, Un siglo de moral economica, supra note 57 at 65–6.
63 The just price is not only an economic category in Vitoria and Soto but is, above all, a
measure of the requirement of commutative justice in the moral–legal order. It puts
into practice the need to ensure the equality and reciprocity of exchanges; see Juan
Antonio Widow, ‘Economic Teachings of Spanish Scholastics’ in Kevin White, ed,
Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery (Washington, DC: Catholic University of
America Press, 1997) 130 at 135–6. Vitoria and Soto were not simply adopting a
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theologian Duns Scotus (but also Roman law), Vitoria accepted that the
goods on the market had no essential or natural value. He was familiar
with the paradox under which water, though normally of no value, may
be sometimes regarded as more valuable than gold. But how, then, if
different people value things differently, could a just exchange be
carried out? To this all the Salamancans would respond that the just
price is relative to how a thing is valued in the place and at the time
when it is sold (‘ex communi hominum aestimatione vel condicto’).64
‘Common estimation,’ again, was a function of many things, including
the product’s relative abundance or scarcity (to which later
Salamancans such as, above all, the canon lawyer Azpilcueta would add
the amount of money available). In other words, though price-formation
was a subjective process, this did not mean that there was no just price. It
was simply that what the just price was depended on local circumstances.65
In this way, Vitoria began to shift his focus away from the subjective
motives of the buyer and seller so as to take account of the larger com-
mercial context in which the justice of the exchange should be assessed.
To what extent did this mean that the moral–legal standard was set by
business practices? To set limits to this flexibility, Vitoria and the other
Salamancans rejected monopolistic practices and considered situations
where the ‘common estimation’ would not function properly as a stan-
dard because there were either too few buyers or too few sellers; they
held that, inasmuch as such a situation arose with respect to necessary
items, the king must fix a ‘legal price’ for the product.66 But the price
of non-necessities, items that later analysts would label ‘luxuries,’ could
be freely agreed – here ‘volenti non fit injuria.’67
A particular point of concern was the novel forms of banking and
credit that facilitated long-distance trading and helped to sustain the gov-
ernment’s engagement in its unending wars. The traditional perspective
on this was provided by the prohibition of usury, extensively discussed by
the Salamancans with reference to question 78 of the second part of the
second part (Secunda Secundae) of the Summa. The prohibition of usury
had many justifications, one of which was that taking interest for a
money loan was prohibited because it was unnatural: money was sterile
nominalist position. Although the price of a commodity was determined subjectively,
that determination reflected an objective assessment of the situation in the market.
64 Vitoria, Comentarios, supra note 32, 77.1 § 2 (117–8).
65 Deckers, supra note 42 at 247–8; Chafuen, supra note 51 at 82–3.
66 See also Ricardo F Crespo, ‘La posibilidad y justicia del intercambio: De Aristoteles a
Marx, pasando por To´mas de Aquino y Francisco de Vitoria’ in Juan Cruz Cruz, ed,
Ley y Dominio en Francisco de Vitoria (Pamplona, Spain: Ediciones Universidad de
Navarra, 2008) 267 at 273–5.
67 Vitoria, Comentarios, supra note 32, 77.4 (120); Barriento Garcı´a, Un siglo de moral
economica, supra note 57 at 47–8.
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and making it produce was contrary to natural law.68 From the twelfth
century on, however, commercial practices had developed with the
purpose of circumventing the prohibition, for example, by breaking
the loan into two or three separate acts of exchange. The justice of this
and other practices had been intensively discussed among the Parisian
doctors throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, whose writ-
ings, as well as those of the Tu¨bingen theologian Konrad Summenhart
(c. 1450–1502) and Cajetan’s De Cambiis (1519) constituted a major inspi-
ration for Vitoria and his followers.
Opening trade routes to the Americas had led to the introduction of
huge quantities of gold and silver into the European and Asian markets.
The principal European marketplaces – Seville and Medina del Campo
in Spain, together with Antwerp, Lyon, and Venice – became buzzing
centres of commercial activity in which merchants from all over
Europe – and also from Spain – engaged in routine speculation for
profit and accumulation. The new commercial culture sat uneasily with
the traditional image of the virtuous life. What should one think of
taking interest for exchanges of money that enabled efficient trading in
successive fairs in different countries? The traditional prohibition of
usury had been motivated by lending for consumption to private individ-
uals or families. But what about lending for productive purposes – for
example, for chartering ships to the Indies or for providing capital for
joint commercial ventures in the expectation of profit?69 The Spanish cam-
bistas operating in Antwerp were actually so worried about such practices
that, in 1530, they sent a report to the University of Paris requesting an
assessment of whether usury was involved. That the response from Paris
condemned such exchanges did not make them disappear, however.
Vitoria, too, was consulted in this connection but confessed only to his
bewilderment by the complexity of the problem and made no important
contribution to its clarification.70 His discussion of the matter four years
later in his lectures on the Summa is likely to have been inspired by the
consultation and by the transformation of the world of international com-
merce to which it related.
The Salamancans did not see money as just a sign or an instrument of
exchange. It had value in itself so that it could also be understood to
accumulate for investment purposes and be exchanged for profit
68 Vitoria, Comentarios, supra note 32, 78.1 § 1, 3 (153–4, 155).
69 For a discussion of the novel practices, see Abelardo del Vigo Gutierrez, Cambistas,
Mercaderes y banqueros en el siglo de oro espan˜ol (Madrid: Biblioteca de autores
christianos, 1997), 211–35.
70 See Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson, The School of Salamanca: Readings in Spanish Monetary
Theory 1544–1605 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) at 38–9 [Grice-Hutchinson,
School of Salamanca]; and for the consultation, Appendix 1, ibid at 120–6.
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(interest). Vitoria’s extensive treatment of usury opens with an apparently
unconditional prohibition of interest-taking in lending. Nevertheless, in
the course of his discussion, he adds several qualifications to that prohibi-
tion and ends up positively endorsing the operations of the cambistas, or
professional money exchangers, inasmuch as they exchanged currencies
but also provided credit and letters of exchange that enabled merchants
to move among fairs in Europe without having to carry large quantities of
money with them.71 Vitoria’s perspective on the emerging financial
network, however, was still provided by focusing on the motivations of
individual cambistas and bankers. This would soon be overcome by the sys-
temic nature of the operations.
It was crucial for the expansion of commerce that merchants were able
to make international payments rapidly and flexibly. This took place
through the instrument of the letter of exchange (cambio de litteras)
issued at one fair to be cashed at another fair a few months later. In
long-term business contacts, it was practical for traders to provide such
letters to each other whereby they could credit their payments at later
fairs against what they had sold at earlier ones. But they would also use
these as independent instruments for making payments to third parties
that would ultimately be guaranteed by the banks and other professional
credit providers by whom the original letter had been signed and issued.72
In the course of the sixteenth century, the system of letters of exchange
(and re-exchange) and various forms of deposit and ex gratia payment
intended to circumvent the prohibition of usury developed into a
massive system of operations within which, according to the assessment
of Vitoria’s Salamanca colleague, the canon lawyer Azpilcueta, the
profit for the cambista would fluctuate somewhere between 5 and 12
per cent. To manage the expanding financial and monetary system, the
number of cambistas and bankers also began to exceed the number of
regular merchants at trade fairs, which turned in the sixteenth century
into accounting conferences where the cambistas cleared their clients’
payments by reciprocal entries in their accounting books so that ‘the
71 Vitoria, Comentarios, supra note 32, 78.2 § 61–75 (223–5). The cambista provides a
service that is useful for the community and for which it is lawful to require a
benefit in return. However, unlike Cajetan, Vitoria extends this right beyond the
practices of professional bankers to the transactions that merchants do on a
permanent basis and that have the objective of facilitating long-distance trade (but
not between nearby cities), ibid, § 66, 69 (227–8, 229).
72 For good descriptions of these practices, see, e.g., Garcı´a Garcı´a & Rodriquez, supra
note 53, 65 at 81–90; Jean Favier, Gold and Spices: The Rise of Commerce in the Middle
Ages, translated by Caroline Higgitt (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1998) at 223–6;
and, of course, Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism: 15th–18th Century, vol 2,
translated by Siaˆn Reynolds, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992) at
138–54.
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fairs gradually became clearing-houses for the whole of Western
Europe.’73
Vitoria and Soto witnessed the development of this financial system,
together with the unprecedented rise of prices in Spain as a result of
the importation of gold and silver from the Indies. This led first
Azpilcueta and then the rest of the Salamancans to subscribe to the quan-
tity theory of money (that the value of money is relative to its quantity on
the market) that wholly departed from assessing lending activities from
the perspective of individual cases of conscience.74 As Soto explains,
The more plentiful money is in Medina the more unfavourable are the terms of
exchange and the higher the price that must be paid by whoever wishes to send
money from Spain to Flanders, since the demand for money is smaller in Spain
than in Flanders. And the scarcer money is in Medina the less he need pay there,
because more people want money in Medina than are sending it to Flanders.75
Four-hundred dinars in Spain might thus have the value of three-
hundred in Flanders without anybody along the way making themselves
guilty of the sin of usury. Moreover, in complicated international
exchanges that involved several parties and a number of currency valua-
tions and exchanges, it was difficult to determine the equilibrium or reci-
procity required by commutative justice. One flexible basis for accepting
interest was that it could be assumed that lending caused some damage to
the lender and that interest could be understood as compensation
(damnum emergens) or even, in some instances, for unattained profit
(lucrum cessans).76 There was, however, rarely any actual measurement of
such losses and even the theologians tended to accept rates that were
in effect in prevailing business practices under the principle of the
‘common estimation.’77
The Salamanca writers thus accepted that price fluctuations among
the fairs may be justly taken into account in determining the value of
money to be exchanged or, indeed, of a letter of exchange issued in
73 Grice-Hutchinson, School of Salamanca, supra note 70 at 11.
74 For a clear statement of the ‘quantity theory’ through a comparison of price levels and
the amounts of money available in France and Spain, see Martin de Azpilcueta,
‘Commentary on the Resolution of Money’ in Stephen J Grabill, ed, Sourcebook in
Late-Scholastic Monetary Theory: The Contributions of Martin de Azpilcueta, Luis de Molina,
SJ, and Juan de Mariana, SJ (Lanham, VA: Lexington, 2007) at para 21 (50–1)
[Azpilcueta, ‘Commentary’] [Grabill].
75 Soto, De iustitia, supra note 9, 6.12.2 (595a–b); and translation in Marjorie Grice-
Hutchinson, Early Economic Thought in Spain 1177–1740 (London: Allen & Unwin,
1978) at 103 [Grice-Hutchinson, Early Economic Thought].
76 Vitoria, Commentarios, supra note 32, 78.2 (167–8); see also Soto, De iustitia, supra note
9, 6.1.1, 6.1.3 (508a–514b, 521b–525b).
77 Vigo Gutierrez, supra note 69 at 304–9.
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one place to be cashed in another. In fact, Soto seems to have been
‘among the first scholastic writers to describe and approve of the credit
creation of the banks.’78 The matter, Azpilcueta and others began to
argue, is no different from profits emerging from exchanges of regular
commodities. In cases where the profit is not unreasonable (i.e., there
is no laesio enormis), no fraud or coercion is involved, and prices are
not manipulated to the detriment of the community, then it is lawful.79
If Vitoria (and Azpilcueta) were still dubious about the justice of all
this and persisted in conceptualizing the exchanger’s profit as a ‘fee’
for services (of counting, depositing, carrying the risk, etc.), by the end
of the century, the Jesuit Luis de Molina (1535–1600) could already
report, that in the opinion of the majority of the doctors, exchanges
that gave a profit based on the divergence of the currencies were per-
fectly legitimate, even if they, as he correctly put it, ‘demand little work,
scarce effort, and no risk.’80
Molina’s views emerged from what was already a ‘systemic’ view of
money and economic exchanges. The fact was that demand and supply
were now being organized on an international scale by bankers in Italy,
Germany, Flanders, and England so that, as a result, princes started to
become, for the first time, even theoretically unable to control the
price levels of goods in their territories. As the network of international
exchanges widened, it began to operate increasingly with different
types of paper money, the value of which was determined by the credit
policies of international banks and other financial institutions. As these
same institutions also lent the funds needed by Charles V to carry out
his incessant wars, he was compelled to direct whatever domestic
sources of revenue he could muster to the payment of his debts, thus
tying his hands in regard to domestic policy as well. There was nothing
new in this. When Charles’s grandfather Maximilian I died in 1519, his
debt to the Fuggers and the Welsers of Germany amounted to eighteen
times his annual income – and late in his regime, Charles’s son Philip
II was compelled to spend two thirds of his income on interest for his
debts.81
78 Grice-Hutchinson, Early Economic Thought, supra note 75 at 104. For Azpilcueta’s
agonizing acceptance of profits from exchange services at successive fairs (‘it seems
absurd to condemn so many merchants who carry this out and by [condemning
them] to hurt everyone’), see Azpilcueta, ‘Commentary,’ supra note 74 at paras 72,
68–76 (83, 82–6).
79 Garcı´a Garcı´a & Rodriguez, supra note 53 at 70; Wood, supra note 53 at 148–9.
80 Luis de Molina, ‘Treatise on Money’ in Grabill, supra note 74, 139 at 188.
81 MN Pearson, ‘Merchants and States’ in James D Tracy, ed, The Political Economy of
Merchant Empires (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press 1991) 41 at 80;
Thomas A Brady, ‘The Rise of Merchant Empires, 1400–1700: A European
Counterpoint’; ibid, 117 at 145–6. The financers were happy to finance these risky
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Vitoria and Soto assumed that these economic exchanges were based
on a universal right of dominium applicable all over the world. The right
of dominium would provide, for example, the basis on which Catholic mer-
chants from Spain could engage in mutually profitable transactions with
Islamic or Jewish traders (as they had, of course, done for centuries),
travel to Protestant markets in Germany and the Netherlands, or trade
and exchange goods with the inhabitants of the New World. The most
famous sketch of this worldwide system of dominium is contained in
Vitoria’s discussion of the right of the Spaniards to travel and trade in
the Indies (ius pergrinandi & ius negotiandi), which is based on the natur-
alist theory of human sociability together with the principle of dominium
that was articulated as ius gentium. Vitoria portrays trade and commerce as
part of the ‘natural partnership and communication’ among humans.
From the beginning of time, ‘everyone was allowed to visit and travel
through any land he wished [and t]his right was clearly not taken away
by the division of property (divisio rerum).’82 It was a practical conse-
quence of this that all nations were to show hospitality to strangers and
everybody had the right to ‘all things that were not prohibited or to
the harm or detriment of others.’83
This, again, meant that
Spaniards may lawfully trade among the barbarians, so long as they do no harm
to their homeland. In other words, they may import the commodities which they
lack, and export the gold, silver, or other things which they have in abundance;
and their princes cannot prevent their subjects from trading with the Spaniards,
nor can the princes of Spain prohibit commerce with the barbarians . . . [T]he
law of nations (ius gentium) is clearly that travellers may carry on trade as long
as they do no harm to the citizens . . . [A]ny human enactment (lex) which pro-
hibited such trade would indubitably be unreasonable.84
And to make clear that he is not only discussing some special (colonial)
relationship between the Spanish and the Indians, Vitoria adds that these
principles are the same as those that apply between Christian common-
wealths. For the Spanish or the French kings to intervene in the travel
of private traders would be ‘unjust . . . and contrary to Christian charity.’85
All of this begins to reveal an international system of commerce, based
on the free use of their dominium by private merchants and bankers,
ventures because it brought them silver that they could invest in further mercantile
activities or convert into gold for excellent profit; see Giovanni Arrighi, The Long
Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times, new and updated ed
(London: Verso, 2010) at 123–9.
82 Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians,’ supra note 13, 3.1 § 2 (278).
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid, 3.1 § 3 (279–80).
85 Ibid, 3.1 § 3 (280).
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which princes were not entitled to impede.86 The extent of dominium was
wide, covering use and non-use, trading and exchange as well as throwing
away of the object. The prince was not entitled to intervene in his sub-
jects’ use of private property ‘unless this is necessary for the defence
and government of the nation.’87 Nor could he limit, without just cause,
hunting, fishing, or collecting firewood from the forest. The right to
use all this flows from the original natural law provision that humans
may use everything that is necessary for their preservation.88 If the ruler
abused his authority, he committed a crime and had the obligation to
restore the property taken.89 To expropriate subjects’ property arbitrarily
– something that had been a persistent reality in fifteenth century Spain
– would turn the prince into a tyrant and trigger the right of resistance of
the commonwealth. Some, such as Mariana, wrote with particular vehe-
mence against the practice of debasing the value of coinage, which he
held as equal to theft by the king (Philip II) of his subjects’ property.90
Expropriation was possible only when the prince had a permissible
causa; that is to say, only so far as needed by the commonwealth –
‘[b]eyond that, man must not only have his own rights as an individual,
but he must also have their exercise in his own control: in other words,
he must be sui iuris, have dominium of himself or his liberty.’91
The theory of dominium as the sphere of freedom – especially, econ-
omic freedom – belonging to human beings by ius gentium now
opened a wholly new way of speaking of universal authority beyond
dubious claims about papal or imperial power. Any statement under
the via antiqua that laid out duties connected with an office or rule
could now be redescribed as a statement about what (some) human
beings had an entitlement to. ‘And the important thing about the six-
teenth-century Spanish theologians and lawyers was that they did frame
those issues in terms of the individual.’92 The universal structure of
private rights that emerges from Vitoria and Soto spoke to popular
views about the electoral basis of Spanish monarchy and bound the
ruler – at least, in principle – to the original authorization to rule in
86 Barrientos Garcı´a, ‘El pensamiento econo´mico,’ supra note 55 at 120.
87 ‘. . . nisi quando eidem reipublicae tuendae & administrandae necesse fuerint’; Soto, De iustitia,
supra note 9, 4.4.1 (301a).
88 Vitoria, Comentarios, supra note 32, 62.1 § 13 (72–3); see also Deckers, supra note 42 at
210–1.
89 Soto, De iustitia, supra note 9, 5.3.5 (430a).
90 Juan de Mariana, ‘A Treatise on the Alteration of Money’ in Grabill, supra note 74, ch 3
at 260.
91 Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature, supra note 9 at 159.
92 Annabel Brett, ‘The Development of the Idea of Citizens’ Rights’ in Quentin Skinner &
Bo Stra˚th, eds, States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2003) 97 at 100.
THE SPANISH CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 27
the common good, understood as the free operation of dominium-rights.93
It established a universal field of economic liberty that could be invoked
against all holders of public power. Wherever authority was being exer-
cised, it could now be assessed in light of universal rights of property,
self-defence, travel, trade, taking of possession of ownerless things, and
so on. This was an inevitable consequence of the fact that Vitoria and
Soto dealt with dominium in the context of commutative and not distribu-
tive justice; that is, relationships among subjects themselves, excluding
ideas about the intervention of public power. Chafuen summarizes the
resulting economic views of the Spanish scholastics as follows:
Late-scholastic theory analyzed profits, wages and rent as matters of commutative
justice and applied rules similar to those used to analyze the prices of goods. The
Schoolmen determined that wages, profits and rents are not for the government
to decide. Since they are beyond the pale of distributive justice, they should be
determined through common estimation of the market.94
The world was an empire, but an ‘empire of private rights.’
But this is, still, not yet all. For the universalization of private dominium-
rights by ius gentium was accompanied by rules on their enforcement
under the theory of just war. In addition to justifying warfare by
Christians – by no means a small accomplishment – this theory did
two things. First, it defined the political commonwealth as the sovereign
state. In the second relectio on the Indians, which moves from the question
of Spanish title to the issue of enforcement by war, Vitoria followed tra-
dition by asking who was entitled to wage war and gave an equally tra-
ditional response – only the prince might do that. And this could only
be a prince who was the head of a ‘perfect community,’ one that was
‘complete in self: that is which is not part of another commonwealth.’95
This also included, for Vitoria, the commonwealths that were part of
the empire, because they were de facto self-sufficient. Far from advocating
any idea of an international community, we see Vitoria, here, declaring
the Holy Roman Empire – of which his king was the head – legally
extinct. Only states might engage in war, and statehood was a matter of
the factual self-sufficiency of an entity.
Second, the theory of just war then came to underwrite the double
structure of dominium and ius gentium discussed earlier. What are the con-
ditions of just war? Religious differences were not, as Vitoria takes pains to
point out, nor ‘enlargement of empire or personal glory or convenience.’
The only just cause for war was ‘when harm ha[d] been inflicted.’ ‘War
93 Giovanni Ambrosetti, Il diritto naturale della riforma catolica (Milan: Giuffre, 1951) at 60–1.
94 Chafuen, supra note 51 at 102–3 [footnote omitted].
95 This theory is laid out in a quite complicated and partly contradictory way in the early
lecture, ‘On the Law of War’; Vitoria, ‘Law of War,’ supra note 31 at 301.
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[was] for the avenging of injuries and the admonishment of enemies.’96
An injury was a violation of the right of dominium. This covered, on the
one hand, the system of rule in the state – for ‘the defence and preser-
vation of the commonwealth is the purpose of war’ – but also of avenging
injuries done to private individuals or their property. This covered, natu-
rally, the injury done to subjects but also injustice (iniuria) to other men.97
In his early relectio on cannibalism, Vitoria had already pointed out that
war could be waged on the Indians in order to protect the innocent. In
the lecture on war, he extended the powers of the prince to punish the
wrongdoer for the damage he has done to include injury done by individ-
uals wherever they might be – a kind of universal power to protect
dominium:
[T]he prince has the authority not only over his own people but also over
foreigners to force them to abstain from harming others; this is his right by
the law of nations [i.e. ius gentium] and the authority of the whole world.98
War, then, was not something for enforcing a substantive view of the good
life or for Christian evangelization. It was allowed only so as to enforce the
public-law jurisdiction of the sovereign prince, which might have been
violated by the enemy, or when the private dominium that individuals
had over both their freedom and their property had been violated.
And this right of just war was applicable everywhere.
VI Sua´rez to Grotius
It fell, then, to the Jesuit Francisco Sua´rez to bring these arguments to a
conclusion in his massive De legibus (1613).99 Like Vitoria, Sua´rez saw
dominium as based not on natural but on positive law; it was something
established by humans for their own utility. Natural law had been
enacted by God and provided for freedom, common ownership, and
peace. It was not subject to change.100 But its content was often derived
only ‘negatively’ from the absence of an express prohibition. In that
space of non-prohibition, the subjective freedom of humans – their
dominium – operated as their legal right to create commonwealths as
well as to divide and exchange property. Natural law, Sua´rez wrote, left
96 Ibid at 303.
97 Francisco de Vitoria, ‘On Dietary Laws’ in Vitoria, Political Writings, supra note 13, 205
at 225.
98 Vitoria, ‘Law of War,’ supra note 31 at 305.
99 Francisco Sua´rez, ‘On Law and God the Lawgiver (De legibus, ac Deo legislatore)’ in
Francisco Sua´rez, Selections from Three Works, vol 2, translated by G Williams (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1944).
100 Ibid, 2.15 § 14 (276), 3.2 § 3 (373–374).
THE SPANISH CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 29
‘the matter to the management of men, such management to be in
accordance with reason.’101
This created a difficulty, however. If private property was based on
human law, did natural law then have nothing to say about stealing? To
strengthen the (subjective) dominium-right, Sua´rez referred back to the dis-
tinction he had made at the outset of his treatise between ius as objective
law and ius as subjective right; that is, as a ‘certain moral power which every
man has either over his own property or with respect to that which is due to
him.’102 When natural law provides for this kind of subjective right (‘ius dom-
inativum’), he explains, it does this always as a positive precept from which
no deviation is allowed. In the original state, everyone had dominium in
common with others. After the intervention of divisio rerum, that positive,
non-derogable right now attached to private property so that stealing
became an evil, subject to punishment, just as taking from the common
stock would earlier have been.103 Even if the institution of private property
was purely human, in other words, once it was created, it was protected by
natural law. This was also a command of faith. Already Soto had made the
point that to deny private property was to engage in heresy. Sua´rez would
agree but would provide a better explanation for why this was so: not
because of utility but because of the nature of subjective ius. None of
this is to say that Sua´rez would turn out to have the preferences of the
modern liberal. In fact, his view of the sphere of liberty of the individual
in society was very limited. But the authoritarian basis for his view of the
government of the commonwealth came from a liberal argument from
individual liberty: ‘for the very reason that man is lord of his own liberty,
it is possible for him to sell or alienate the same.’104
But although Sua´rez took great trouble to distinguish between natural
law on the one hand, and ius gentium as positive customary law on the
other, he still did not hold the two as completely distinct. The relationship
between the two was one between that which was intrinsically necessary and
that which contributed to the attainment of the necessary in the real con-
ditions of the world. Sua´rez gives two examples: diplomatic and commercial
exchanges. Peace is dictated by natural law and the function of the ambas-
sador was to contribute to peace. However, this did not make diplomacy part
of natural law. Other means might lead to peace as well; hence its nature as
ius gentium and not as natural law. It was part of the way humans had come to
seek the good of their communities. The same argument applied to inter-
national commerce. Trade was by no means intrinsically necessary. But it
101 Ibid, 2.14 § 6 (270).
102 Ibid, 1.2 § 5 (30).
103 Ibid, 2.14 § 13 and 16–17 (275–7, 278–9).
104 Ibid, 2.14 § 18 (279); see also Reijo Wilenius, The Social and Political Theory of Francisco
Sua´rez (Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica, 1963) at 102–8.
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might be useful for the good of nations. Thus, like diplomatic relations,
trade was established by the customary activities under the ius gentium and
– like the subjective rights on which trade relations were based – once
trade relations had been established, they were binding. As Sua´rez expressly
says, ‘[I]t has been established by the ius gentium that commercial inter-
course shall be free, and it would be a violation of that system of law if
such intercourse were prohibited without reasonable cause.’105
Like diplomacy, international commerce was a ‘system’ and like a vio-
lation of the former, a violation of the latter undermined the natural pur-
poses for which that system had been set up and which were laid down in
‘ius’ in its first or ‘objective’ sense, as ‘that which is in accordance with
justice.’106 Of course, most of the rules of property or commerce dealt
with relationships between individual right-holders and therefore had
to be distinguished from the relations that pertained between princes
and sovereigns. As Sua´rez explains in a famous passage,
A particular matter . . . can be subject then to ius gentium in either one of two
ways: first it is the law which all the various nations and people ought to
observe in their relations with each other; secondly, on the ground that it is a
body of laws which individual states or kingdoms observe within their borders,
but which are called ius gentium because the said laws are similar [in each
instance] and are commonly accepted.107
This distinction between public international law as law among those
who hold dominium in terms of jurisdiction over territory and the universal
laws governing inter-individual relations of contract and ownership has, of
course, become a key part of our understanding of two types of universal
law. Even as private relationships are covered by the civil laws of the
various countries, the general principles of those civil laws – including,
above all, the freedom of commercial exchanges on the basis of private
ownership – are still valid as ius gentium and enforceable through all
those means that enable reaction to serious injuries to dominium irrespec-
tive of where they take place. To disrupt commercial relations, writes
Sua´rez, is a violation of ius gentium that is punishable by war.108
* * *
105 Sua´rez, supra note 99, 2.19 § 7 (347).
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid, 2.19 § 8 (347).
108 Ibid, 2.19 § 7 (347); and on the relevant grounds of just (aggressive) war in the case of
‘denial, without reasonable cause, of the common rights of nations, such as the right of
transit over highways, trading in common &c.,’ see ‘Disp XIII: On War,’ ibid, section 4 §
3 (817) (On The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity) as well as Josef Soder,
Francisco Sua´rez und das Vo¨lkerrecht: Grundgedanken zu Staat, Recht und internationale
Beziehungen (Frankfurt: Metzner, 1973) at 261.
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In twentieth-century debates about empire, focus is often on the first
aspect of Sua´rez’s twofold notion of ius gentium: imperialism as the predo-
minance of a single sovereign, the hegemony of one state over others. It is
this perspective, also, that has inspired students of Vitoria and the School
of Salamanca to link their heritage to the formal expansion of Castilian
rule over the American colonies. But what I would like to suggest, here,
is that far more important than their writings on the Indies are the
texts discussing dominium as the (subjective) right of property that is
valid universally under the ius gentium and that can be, together with
the derivative rights of travel and trade, enforced by just war.
From this perspective, the Spanish theologians and jurists of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries appear not so much as reluctant advo-
cates of a formal Spanish lordship over distant peoples but as articulators
and ideologists of a global structure of horizontal relationships between
holders of the subjective rights of dominium – a structure of human
relationships that we have been accustomed to label ‘capitalism.’ In
terms of the study of imperial relationships, the Spaniards appear dis-
tinctly as advocates less of ‘formal empire’ by advocating or supporting
territorial annexations than of ‘informal empire,’ the control of resources
through the exercise of private-law relationships of contract and property.
Their significance is not limited to advocating imperial domination
through the use of formal state power – a strategy that Europeans have
resorted to only occasionally and, more often than not, with dire
results for themselves. Instead, they appear as early articulators of the
much more powerful and long-standing type of informal imperial domi-
nation that is achieved through a worldwide pattern of acquisition and
exchange of private property by which – as the rulers of Castile would
themselves learn quite rapidly – formal state policies are also controlled,
enabled, or undermined, as befits the global market.
This was, of course, immediately seized on by the young advocate of
the Dutch East India Company (VOC), Hugo Grotius, in his long
defence, written in 1604–6, of the aggressive policy of the company to
defeat Portuguese and Spanish efforts at maintaining a monopoly over
trade in the East Indies.109 The debt owed by Grotius to the Spaniards
– Vitoria, Soto, Vazquez, and others – is great and is often acknowledged,
not least by Grotius himself.110 He used them precisely to argue, against
the Portuguese, for the freedom of navigation and of trade on the
basis of a subjective right of dominium. Even if Grotius failed to
mention Sua´rez in his main work De jure belli ac pacis which came out in
109 Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De jure praedae), ed and intro by
MJ van Ittersum (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2006). [Grotius, Commentary]
110 See especially Alfred Dufour, ‘Les ‘Magni hispani’ dans l’oeuvre de Grotius’ in Grunert &
Seelmann, supra note 16, 351 at 351–80.
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1625, many of his formulations there, including his discussion of the
objective and subjective meanings of ius, were ‘undoubtedly’ inspired
by Sua´rez.111
Grotius fully grasped the implications of what the Spanish had been
saying and deployed them in the service of the emerging Dutch commer-
cial empire. Where the Iberians had weakened themselves by seizing vast
stretches of territory in remote regions, the VOC was able to focus directly
on profit making. This required refraining from territorial control but
also internalizing protection costs through the company’s setting up a
military force of its own. The Dutch surpassed the Iberians because, as
Arrighi has put it, the ‘Iberian enterprise’ ‘was missing . . . an obsession
with profit and “economizing,” rather than with crusade; a systematic
avoidance of military involvements and territorial acquisition that had
no direct or indirect justification in the “maximization of profit.”’112
This story is well known and much commented upon, so I will just limit
myself to two points regarding the worldwide spread of dominium-rights
and their enforcement by war. First, Grotius’s search for a ‘minimal
natural law’ as an uncontestable basis for universal law led him to high-
light the desire for self-preservation as the legal foundation for the first
two of his natural laws:
LAW I. It shall be permissible to defend [one’s own] life and to shun that which
threatens to prove injurious.
LAW II. It shall be permissible to acquire for oneself, and to retain, those things
which are useful for life.113
These laws account for Grotius’s reputation as the representative of an
‘essentially modern theory of subjective natural rights.’114 It would be
futile to review here, once again, the persistence with which Grotius pri-
vileged the subjective meaning of ‘ius’ as a right or a faculty that all
human beings could ‘have’ as against the old, ‘objective’ meaning,
under which it denoted a justice that merely ‘was,’ on the way from De
111 Annabel Brett, ‘Natural Right and Civil Community: The Civil Philosophy of Hugo
Grotius’ (2002) 45:1 Historical Journal 31 at 34 [Brett, ‘Natural Right and Civil
Community’]. For a discussion of Grotius’s debt to Sua´rez in respect of his famous
‘etiamsi daremus’ hypothesis, the case of there ( per impossibilem) being ‘no God,’ see
MB Crowe, ‘The ‘Impious Hypothesis’: A Paradox in Hugo Grotius?’ in Knud
Haakonssen, ed, Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern Natural Law (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,
1999) at 13–20 and references therein [Haakonssen, Modern Natural Law].
112 Arrighi, supra note 81 at 159.
113 These laws appear twice in the present translation of De jure praedae: first in Grotius,
Commentary, supra note 109, ch 2 at 23, and Appendix A at 500.
114 Benjamin Straumann, ‘Ancient Cesarian Lawyers in a State of Nature: Roman Tradition
and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius’s De iure praedae’ (2006) 34:3 Political Theory 328 at
330.
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jure praedae to his mature treatise De jure belli ac pacis of 1625. But it is
useful, nevertheless, to highlight that Grotius linked his subjective
rights expressly to a view of social relations governed by commutative
(which he called ‘expletive’) justice instead of distributive justice which
he relegated to the strictly non-legal field of human ‘appetites’ (instead
of the legal ‘faculties’).115 The universal validity of these rights was
based simply on the universal character of the desire for self-preservation.
They had a corollary, of course, which derived the social consequences of
this (individualist) morality as follows:
LAW III. Let no one inflict injury upon his fellow.
LAW IV. Let no one seize possession of that which has been taken into the posses-
sion of another.
LAW V. Evil deeds must be corrected.116
Human beings not only were desirous of self-preservation, but also –
unlike animals – possessed reason. And reason taught them to forego
immediate satisfaction of their needs and to join society in which their
long-term interests would be best served. Private dominium and sociability
were not in conflict but, rightly understood, complementary – just as sub-
jective rights were complementary to the obligation of others to respect
them. Grotius’s famous concept of ‘sociality,’ which is supposed to be
the ‘mother’ of natural law, is thus nothing else than the duty to
respect the rights of others.117 It is not the ideal of a substantive moral
order, even less of an order of ends for the good life. Human beings
join civil society for its usefulness in providing protection for their
(pre-social) rights.118
In civil society, the enforcement of these rights is the monopoly of the
magistrates; that is, public power. But in the international realm exempli-
fied by the high seas, there is no such public power. Thus, although
natural rights are also valid in the state of nature, they can only be
enforced there by the right-holders themselves: ‘[A] private war is under-
taken justly in so far as judicial recourse is lacking.’119 An individual’s right
had four aspects: the right of self-defence, the right to reparation for
damage to person, the right to reparation for damage to goods – and
115 See especially Peter Haggenmacher, ‘Droits subjectifs et syste`me juridique chez
Grotius’ in Luc Foisneau, ed, Politique, droit et the´ologie chez Bodin, Grotius et Hobbes
(Paris: Kime´, 1997) 73.
116 These laws appear twice: first in Grotius, Commentary, supra note 109, ch 2 at 27–9, and
again in ibid, Appendix A at 500.
117 Knud Haakonssen, ‘Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought’ in Haakonssen,
Modern Natural Law, supra note 111 at 38.
118 See further, Brett, ‘Natural Right and Civil Community,’ supra note 111.
119 Grotius, Commentary, supra note 109, ch 8 at 142.
34 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
crucially, the right to punish the wrong-doer. In the world outside civil
society, a world governed by natural rights, even penal law is relegated
to commutative justice. Even punishment is in the hands of the right-
holder.120 The VOC was, then, entitled to wage war against the
Portuguese in self-defence and to receive the booty it had acquired as,
in part, reparation, in part, punishment. Moreover, in seeking to break
the Iberian monopoly, the Dutch were supporting the interests of com-
merce and exchange – interests with respect to which humanity was
united.121 Their war was thus on behalf of humanity itself.
VII Conclusion
In the history of natural law, Grotius’s position as straddling tradition and
novelty is a commonplace. But a wide consensus seems to be emerging
that he ‘extracts from Scholastic views on natural law and moral theology
the essential points that are relevant to moral and political philosophy.’122
As Tierney observes, reading Grotius ‘one seems to be reading Sua´rez
transposed to a different idiom.’123 There are many differences between
the scholastics and Grotius in sources and styles of argument.
Nevertheless, they share the narrative of the contractual emergence of
dominium out of common property, and found their analyses very
largely on the search for commutative justice between individual right-
holders. And they, of course, assume that this frame is valid universally,
irrespective of cultural or religious distinctions. In other words, they
react to the expansion of trade and commerce by producing a legal
and political vocabulary that takes that expansion as largely natural and
articulates the social world created through it as a universal network of
inter-individual relations.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, Spanish imperi-
alism emerged from the exercise of public power by the ruler of
Castile – at one point, the head of the Holy Roman Empire – in the
form of conquest and settlement, administration, and the conduct of
mercantilist policies that ultimately failed to sustain Spain’s imperial
ambitions or even the position of Spain among the European empires.
Spain was followed by the Netherlands and England (with a brief
French interlude), which understood the importance of the distinctions
120 Haggenmacher, supra note 115.
121 Grotius, Commentary, supra note 109, ch 12 at 303.
122 Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, vol 2 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008) at 96, 98.
123 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and
Church Law 1150–1625 (Grand Rapids, MI: William P Eerdmans Publishing, 1997) at
316.
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concocted by the School of Salamanca; their imperialism was the imperi-
alism of free trade, carried out by private companies through private
transactions and private war. Public resources would not be wasted
when private operators could be liberated to carry out the work of disci-
plining the natives through commerce and the extraction of resources. In
due course, the fact that all dominium originally had to do with humans’
exercising power of over humans was forgotten, and the distinction
between the two realms of the public and the private was overlaid by
other distinctions, such as those between constraint and freedom, regu-
lation and spontaneity, and perhaps, simply old-fashioned and modern.
There is no doubt on which side imperialism has gained its greatest
victories: since decolonization, Western domination of the ‘people
without history’ has returned to its classical mainstay, informal empire,
the creation of wealth and influence and the distribution of material
and spiritual resources through the exercise of private power. Today’s
ius gentium continues to be divided into the law of treaties, on the one
side, and the law of contract, on the other. There is no doubt on which
side the most significant aspect of dominium – that is, the power of
human beings over other human beings – is exercised. It is a great
paradox that Spanish political leaders never really understood that this
was what their brightest thinkers were prophesying.
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